

# Buffer Overflow Attacks

Computer Systems 3.10.3-4,



# Hacking

- Roots in phone phreaking
- White Hat vs Gray Hat vs Black Hat
- Over 50% of Modern Software Development is Black Hat!



Tip the balance: Be a force for good... not evil!

# Disclaimer – Buffer Overflow Attack

- DO NOT ABUSE!
- Modern code is protected from this attack several ways
- Ancient form of hacking
  - First documented in 1972
  - Used in 1988 “Morris Worm” – First internet virus
  - Used to hack Unix, Windows, Xbox, PS2, Wii
- Taught here as an example of what to watch out for!

# Example Vulnerable Code

```
bool getString() {  
    char buffer[81];  
    buffer[0]='\0';  
    gets(buffer);  
    if (strlen(buffer)>0) {  
        printf("Read line: %s\n",buffer);  
        return true;  
    }  
    return false;  
}
```

- “gets” reads from stdin until it finds either an end-of-file or a newline (which is replaced by a null terminator).
- “gets” copies whatever it reads into the argument (buffer).
- “gets” does not check to make sure result fits in space allocated.

# x86 expansion

```
bool getString() {
    char buffer[81];
    buffer[0]='\0';
    gets(buffer);
    if (strlen(buffer)>0) {
        printf("Read line: %s\n",buffer);
        return true;
    }
    return false;
}
```

push %rbp  
mov %rsp,%rbp  
sub \$0x60,%rsp

movb \$0x0,-0x60(%rbp)

lea -0x60(%rbp),%rax  
mov %rax,%rdi  
callq 4004c0 <gets@plt>


lea -0x60(%rbp),%rax  
movzbl (%rax),%eax  
test %al,%al  
je 400649 <getString+0x40>

mov \$0x1,%eax  
jmp 40064e <getString+0x45>


lea -0x60(%rbp),%rax  
mov %rax,%rsi  
mov \$0x40071f,%edi  
mov \$0x0,%eax  
callq 400490 <printf@plt>

mov \$0x0,%eax  
leaveq  
retq


# stack after call to getString



# stack in getString after preamble



# Stack left to right (little endian)




# Buffer Overflow

- Put a very long string into an input file
- Much longer than the length of “buffer”
- So long that it writes over what is past “buffer” in getString’s frame
  - What is past “buffer”?
- So long that it writes over the lowest address in main’s frame!
  - What is in the lowest address in main’s frame?


[illegible]

## Alignment Padding

# Stack left to right (little endian)



# stack in getString after gets



# stack in getString at return

```

...
return true;
894:  b8 01 00 00 00    mov  $0x1,%eax
899:  eb 05             jmp  8a0 <getString+0x47>
...
8a0:  c9               leaveq
8a1:  c3               retq ...
  
```

return address

%rsp

%rip (value is 0x7264 6461 2074 6572)

Segmentation  
Fault

| Address             | Value (64 bit)      |
|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0000 7FFF FFFF E890 | 0000 7FFF FFFF E980 |
| 0000 7FFF FFFF E888 | 0000 0001 5555 46E0 |
| 0000 7FFF FFFF E880 | 0000 7FFF FFFF E988 |
| 0000 7FFF FFFF E878 | 7264 6461 2074 6572 |
| 0000 7FFF FFFF E870 | 7062 7273 6e69 616d |
| 0000 7FFF FFFF E868 | 7265 6666 7562 6220 |
| ...                 | ...                 |
| 0000 7FFF FFFF E828 | 2074 6168 7420 676e |
| 0000 7FFF FFFF E820 | 6972 7473 2072 6574 |
| 0000 7FFF FFFF E818 | 6361 7261 6863 2061 |
| 0000 7FFF FFFF E810 | 2073 6920 7369 6854 |
| 0000 7FFF FFFF E808 | 0000 7FFF F7AA EDB2 |
| 0000 7FFF FFFF E800 | 0000 0000 0000 0000 |
| ....                | ....                |

# Mixing Hex and ASCII

- Normally treat a file as a string of ASCII characters
- In fact, each ASCII character has a hex representation...

|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |     |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----|
| T | h | i | s |   | i | s |   | a |   | c | h | a | r | a | c | ... |
| 5 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 2 | 6 | 7 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 6 | ... |
| 4 | 8 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 |     |

- We can write a program to put non-ASCII hex data in a file
  - See [xmp mix](#)
- Use the command “od -Ax -t x1z” to show both ASCII and hex

```
000000 54 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 61 20 63 68 61 72 61 63  >This is a charac<
000010 74 65 72 20 73 74 72 69 6e 67 de ad be ef 0a      >ter string.....<
00001f
```

# Example of a file with ASCII and Hex



- ASCII Representation on terminal “cat file”...

```
This is a character stringP3i
```


- Mixed representation “od -Ax -t x1z file”

```
000000 54 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 61 20 63 68 61 72 61 63 >This is a charac<
000010 74 65 72 20 73 74 72 69 6e 67 de ad be ef 0a >ter string.....<
00001f
```


# GEDIT Mixed File




# “String” in file (stdin) read by gets



# Stack left to right (little endian)



# stack in getString after gets



# stack in getString after gets

```
...
mov  $0x1,%eax
jmp  40064e <getString+0x45>
...
leaveq
retq
```

|                         | Address             | Value (64 bit)       |
|-------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| main's stack frame      | 0000 7FFF FFFF E900 | 0000 7FFF FFFF E900F |
|                         | 0000 7FFF FFFF E8F8 | 0000 7FFF F7A5 2B45  |
| return address          | 0000 7FFF FFFF E8F0 | 0000 7FFF FFFF E90F  |
| %rbp                    | 0000 7FFF FFFF E8E8 | 0000 5555 5555 48a2  |
|                         | 0000 7FFF FFFF E8E0 | dead beef dead beef  |
|                         | 0000 7FFF FFFF E8D8 | 7265 6666 7562 6220  |
| getString's stack frame | ...                 | ...                  |
|                         | 0000 7FFF FFFF E898 | 0000 0000 0040 05D9  |
|                         | 0000 7FFF FFFF E890 | 7465 7220 7374 7269  |
|                         | 0000 7FFF FFFF E888 | 6120 6368 6172 6163  |
| buffer                  | 0000 7FFF FFFF E880 | 5468 6973 2069 7320  |
|                         | 0000 7FFF FFFF E878 | 4206 4000 0000 0000  |
| %rsp                    | 0000 7FFF FFFF E870 | 0100 0000 0000 0000  |
|                         | ....                |                      |

# What could be at return address?

## Your evil code!



# Problems with Buffer Overflow Attack

- Need to know offset from buffer to top of stack / return @
- Need to mix ASCII with hexadecimal in input file
- String can't contain "newline" (0x0A)
- Need to know address of pirate routine to "return" to
- Hard to "return" to conventional flow after attack... return @ overwritten
- %rbp has been overwritten – lost top of caller's stack frame
- Randomized load uses offsets, not absolute addresses
- Get that from objdump -d
- Can write a program to do that
- Basic restriction
- Challenge for project 4
- Can get original return@ from objdump -d, or just don't return
- %rsp points to bottom of caller's frame, and we can find its size from objdump -d, or just don't use
- Turn off randomized load

# Address Space Layout Randomization

- ASLR is a feature introduced to prevent things like buffer overflow attacks
- Randomizes where your code is loaded
  - Every time you execute, your function is loaded at a different address
  - Hence objdump no longer prints complete address – just last three digits
- ASLR will prevent “return” to a different function in the same code
  - function instructions are at a different place each run
- gdb turns off ASLR
  - code is always loaded at 0x0000 5555 5555 xxxx
- To turn off ASLR on LDAP: `>setarch linux64 -R <command>`

# Preventing Buffer Overflow w/ “Guard”

```
bool getString() {  
    struct bufStr {  
        char buffer[81];  
        int guard;  
    } buf = { { 0x00 } { 0xFEDCBA98 } };  
    gets(buf.buffer);  
    if (strlen(buffer)>0) {  
        assert(buf.guard==0xFEDCBA98);  
        printf("Read line: %s\n",buf.buffer);  
        return true;  
    }  
    return false;  
}
```

- guard goes in stack frame after (on top of) buffer
- If buffer overflow occurs, guard will be modified
- If buffer overflow occurs, assert will fail
- Unless hacker did objdump and put the guard value in his hacked file

# gcc stack guarding

- If you compile with the `-fstack-protector` flag, gcc will automatically provide stack guards for you
- If gcc finds a corrupted stack guard, it prints...  
`*** stack smashing detected ***: ./target terminated`  
`Segmentation fault`
- gcc stack protection is OFF by default on LDAP machines

# Preventing Buffer Overflow w/ fgets

```
bool getString() {  
    char buffer[81];  
    buffer[0]='\0';  
    fgets(buffer,sizeof(buffer),stdin);  
    if (strlen(buffer)>0) {  
        printf("Read line: %s\n",buffer);  
        return true;  
    }  
    return false;  
}
```

- “fgets” reads from any stream (third parameter)
- “fgets” reads until EITHER newline (0x10), OR second parameter reached.
- “fgets” prevents buffer overwrite

# Preventing w/ Memory Protection

- Your entire address space is divided into 4096 byte “pages”
  - $4096 = 2^{12}$ ; It takes 12 bits, or 3 hex digits to count from 0 to 4095
  - 64 bit addresses... first 52 bits (13 hex characters) are page number
  - 64 bit addresses... last 12 bits (3 hex characters) are offset within page
- Each page in memory has three independent security attributes:
  - Can I read memory in this page
  - Can I write memory in this page
  - Can I execute instructions in this page
- If you try to perform an action on a page which is not allowed, you will get a segmentation violation

# Default Memory Protection

- When your code is loaded into memory, it is loaded in pages that allow read and execute, but not write
- Pages in the stack allow read or write, but not execution
- Pages on the heap (malloc'ed space) allow read or write, but not execution
- There are library routines to modify memory protection for a page, but by default, there is no memory you are allowed to both write to, and execute from.
- If your evil code is not already loaded, it's hard to execute it!
  - Project 4 has special code to avoid this problem!