Cache Side Channel Defense System -Ezgi Demirayak

It's a research project about defenses to current cache side channel atacks.

Cache Side Channel Attacks

   There exist mainly two types of software cache-based sidechannel

attacks: access-driven and time-driven attacks. In access-driven attacks, the adversary has control over one or multiple spy processes, which share the cache with the victim process. Due to cache sharing, the victim process may evict the spy process’ cache lines/entries when it accesses keydependent (i.e., critical) cache lines/entries. By measuring the access times of itsowncache lines/entries, the spy process can figure out which cache lines/entries are evicted by the victim process. Such cache access behavior of the victim process may leak enough information for the adversary to infer the key. In time-driven attacks, the adversary sends various encryption/decryption requests to the target crypto process. Upon receiving responses, the adversary records the encryption times. Since the secret key may correlate to different number of cache misses upon different inputs/ outputs, the variations among encryption times may provide sufficient information for the adversary to derive the key.

I'm researching in order to find a defense system to prevent the attackers from reaching LLC.