STAR: Secure Real-Time Transaction Processing with Timeliness Guarantees [*†]

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Abstract

Real-time databases are needed in security-critical applications, e.g., e-commerce, agile manufacturing, and military applications. In these applications, transactions and data items can be classified into several security levels according to their clearance and sensitivity levels. It is essential for real-time databases to prevent illegal direct/indirect transfer of sensitive data, e.g., secret trade, manufacturing, or operational data, between transactions belonging to different security levels. Further, transactions should be committed within their deadlines, i.e., before the market, manufacturing, or battle field status changes. In this paper, we present a novel real-time database architecture, in which illegal direct/indirect inter-level information flows are prevented while controlling the deadline miss ratio for admitted transactions to remain below a certain threshold. In our approach, mandatory access control mechanisms are applied for security purposes. QoS management, admission control, and feedback control schemes are applied to support certain guarantees on miss ratio against potential overload and data conflicts. A detailed simulation study shows that our approach can support the specified miss ratio preventing illegal information flows even in the presence of unpredictable workloads and varying degrees of data contention, whereas baseline approaches fail.

1 Introduction

Real-time databases are needed in many security-critical applications, e.g., e-commerce, online stock trading, agile manufacturing, and military applications. In these applications, transactions and data items can be classified according to their clearance and sensitivity levels. It is essential to prevent unlawful information flows between different security levels to protect important data related to trading, manufacturing, and military operations. It is also important for real-time databases to process transactions within their deadlines, i.e., before the market, manufacturing, or battle filed status changes. Current solutions focus on preventing information leakage between different security levels at the cost of providing no performance guarantees. This paper presents a solution which does not only maintain the security property, but also gives real-time performance guarantees.

Most secure database systems apply a mandatory access control mechanism based on the Bell-LaPadula model [6], which is described in terms of *subjects* and *objects*. Objects are data items and subjects are active processes, i.e., transactions in databases, which request access to objects. Data and transactions are classified into several security levels, e.g., Top Secret, Secret, Classified, and Unclassified. In the Bell-LaPadula model, two main restrictions are imposed on all data accesses. A transaction can read an object only if the transaction's security (clearance) level is equal to or higher than the object's security (sensitivity) level. A transaction can write an object only if its security level is equal to or lower than the object's security level. Informally, these access restrictions are called "read-below" and "write-above" restrictions, respectively.

The Bell-LaPadula access restrictions can prevent direct information flows between transactions belonging to different security levels. However, it is not sufficient to prevent indirect information flows, called *covert channels* [14], in which transactions can conspire for an illegal inter-level information transfer. A higher (security) level transaction can either hold or release an exclusive resource or lock on a data item. A conspiring lower level transaction requests the same resource or data item. As a result, the lower level transaction is delayed when the higher level one holds the corresponding resource or lock. The lower level transaction can interpret the presence and absence of the delay as 0 and 1, respectively.

Covert channels based on data and resources can be prevented by favoring lower level transactions in the resolution

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of inter-level data/resource conflicts, which occur between transactions belonging to different security levels. In this way, lower level transactions can *not* know the presence of higher level transactions, i.e., no covert channel. This notion of *non-interference* should be satisfied to prevent covert channels [9]. However, this may increase the deadline miss ratio, especially for high security level transactions. This is because high security level transactions will be preempted, aborted, and restarted for security purposes in case of inter-level data/resource conflicts. This can be a serious problem, possibly leading to a system failure in secure *real-time* databases, in which timely transaction processing is essential.

In this paper, we present a novel real-time main memory database architecture, called **STAR** (Security and Timeliness Assurance in Real-time databases). STAR fully supports the Bell-LaPadula model and notion of non-interference to prevent direct/indirect information leakage between different security levels. At the same time, our approach provides certain guarantees on average/transient miss ratio for admitted transactions, regardless of their security levels. To our best knowledge, this is the first approach which prevents illegal direct/indirect information flows while providing timeliness guarantees in real-time databases.

In this paper, transactions are classified into two security levels. In the remainder of this paper, we follow a convention in which low and high security classes are called Class 0 and 1, respectively. For CPU scheduling and concurrency control, Class 0 transactions are always treated in a preferred manner to prevent both resource and data based covert channels. We apply QoS management, admission control, and feedback control schemes to support the specified average/transient (deadline) miss ratio for both Classes 0 and 1. Based on the current performance error, i.e., the difference between the specified miss ratio and currently measured one, the feedback control loop computes the required CPU utilization adjustment. QoS management and admission control schemes enforce the required CPU utilization adjustment to support the specified average/transient miss ratio.

In a simulation study, we show that our approach can achieve a significant performance improvement, in terms of miss ratio, compared to several baseline approaches. In addition, for a large range of workloads and different degrees of data contention, our approach can support the specified average/transient miss ratio preventing illegal direct/indirect information flows, while other approaches fail.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, our real-time database model is discussed. Main performance metrics and performance specification issues are also described. Section 3 discusses our real-time database architecture for security (in terms of access control) and miss ratio guarantees in detail. The performance evaluation results are presented in Section 4. Related work is discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses the avenues for future work.

2 Database Model and Performance Metrics

In this section, our real-time database model is discussed and performance metrics are described. Performance specification issues are discussed in terms of these performance metrics.

2.1 Real-Time Database Model

In our approach, a main memory database model, in which the CPU is considered the main system resource, is applied. Main memory databases have been increasingly used for real-time data management such as online stocking trading, e-commerce, and voice/data networking. This is mainly because of their relatively high performance and decreasing main memory cost [2, 5, 23]. We consider firm deadline semantics. Tardy transactions − transactions that have missed their deadlines − are considered valueless, and therefore, are aborted upon their deadline misses.



Figure 1. Access Restrictions in the Bell-LaPadula Model

In our approach, all transactions and data items are classified into either Class 0 or 1 (i.e., the low or high security class). Transactions can read/write data items according to the access restrictions required by the Bell-LaPadula model as shown in Figure 1. Note that transactions can read/write any data at the same security class. However, Class 1 transactions can not write Class 0 data. In contrast, Class 0 transactions can can not read Class 1 data items. In this way, *direct* information flows between Classes 0 and 1 can be prevented. We also prevent indirect information flows between the two classes.

Separate from the security classes, we also assume that each transaction has two versions, which support different

QoS levels, i.e., level 0 and 1. At QoS level 1 (i.e., the higher QoS level), a transaction requires more CPU cycles. When overloaded, some transactions' QoS can be degraded from level 1 to level 0 to reduce the CPU utilization. For the clarity of presentation, a detailed discussion about the security support and QoS management including their interactions with other components in our real-time database architecture is given in Section 3.

2.2 Performance Metrics

We consider security an all-or-nothing correctness criterion rather than a performance metric, similar to [8]. Unlike several real-time database research projects such as [3, 21], in which covert channels can be momentarily allowed to improve the miss ratio, we do not consider security a trade-off item for performance reasons. Therefore, deadline miss ratio is considered a single performance metric in our approach:

• *Average Miss Ratio*: For the admitted transactions in Class i $(0 \leq i \leq 1)$, let $\#Tardy_i$ and $\#Timely_i$ represent the number of transactions which missed their deadlines and that finished within their deadlines, respectively. The miss ratio of the transactions belonging to Class i measured within a certain time interval is:

$$MR_i = 100 \times \frac{\#Tardy_i}{\#Tardy_i \ + \ \#Timely_i} \ (\%)$$

In STAR, average MR_0 and MR_1 should be below a certain miss ratio threshold, e.g., 5%. Note that we manage MR_0 and MR_1 separately instead of considering the aggregate miss ratio. This is to prevent an undesirable situation, in which one security class suffers a high miss ratio, whereas the aggregate miss ratio is below the specified value.

• *Transient Miss Ratio*: Long-term performance metrics such as average miss ratio are not sufficient for the performance specification of dynamic systems, since their performance could widely vary in a short time interval. To address this problem, transient performance metrics are adopted from control theory for a real-time system performance specification [16]. *Overshoot* (M_p) is the worst-case system performance in the transient system state, i.e., the highest miss ratio over the specified threshold in the transient state. *Settling time* (t_s) is the time for a transient overshoot to decay and reach the steady state performance, in which $0 \leq MR_i \leq \theta_i + 0.01 \times \theta_i$ where MR_i $(0 \leq i \leq 1)$ is the miss ratio of Class i transactions, and θ_i is the miss ratio threshold required for Class i.

2.3 Performance Specification

In this paper, we consider the following performance specification as an example to illustrate the applicability of our approach for secure transaction processing with miss ratio guarantees: "*Perf-Spec* $= \{MR_0,\ MR_1 \leq 5\%,\ M_p \leq 20\%,\ t_s \leq 80sec,\ CPU\ Utilization \geq 80\%\}$". This specification requires us to limit the average miss ratio below 5% for Classes 0 and 1, respectively. We also set M_p = 20%, therefore, an MR_0 or MR_1 overshoot should not exceed $6\% = 5\% \times (1 + 0.2)$. A potential overshoot should decay within 80sec. Given a sampling rate, the overshoot and settling time have a trade-off relation with each other. It is very hard, if at all possible, to minimize both the overshoot and settling time for a given sampling rate [20]. In this paper, we consider a somewhat long settling time, e.g., think time between trades, is tolerable as long as the corresponding overshoot is low. We also require the CPU utilization to be at least 80% to avoid a trivial case in which average/transient MR_0 and MR_1 are satisfied due to the underutilization. In summary, this entire set of performance specification is the performance guarantee supported by our approach.

3 An Architecture for Security and Timeliness Guarantees

In this section, we present our real-time database architecture for security and timeliness assurance as shown in Figure 2. Incoming real-time transactions with firm deadlines are scheduled in one of the two ready queues according to their security classes. Scheduling and concurrency control policies are provided for transaction processing. At each sampling instant, MR_0, MR_1, and the CPU utilization are monitored. The miss ratio and utilization controllers compute the required CPU utilization adjustment (ΔU in Figure 2) based on the current performance error such as the miss ratio overshoot or CPU underutilization. When $\Delta U < 0$ (i.e., overloaded), the QoS manager degrades the transaction QoS. The admission controller enforces the remaining utilization adjustment after potential QoS degradation, i.e., ΔU_{new}, to prevent overload. In the following subsections, each component is discussed in detail.

3.1 Transaction Handler

The transaction handler is a fundamental component for real-time database services. It consists of a concurrency controller (CC) and a basic scheduler. The basic scheduler schedules transactions in either Q_0 or Q_1 according to their security classes, i.e., Class 0 (Class 1) transactions are scheduled in Q_0 (Q_1). The Bell-LaPadula access restrictions are applied for data accesses. CPU scheduling and concurrency control are performed in a manner to support the notion of non-interference as follows.

To prevent covert channels, Class 0 transactions (scheduled in Q_0) always receive a higher priority than Class 1



Figure 2. STAR Architecture

transactions. A transaction in Q_1 can be scheduled if there is no ready transaction in Q_0. Also, a Class 1 transaction is preempted upon the arrival of a Class 0 transaction. In this way, Class 0 transactions can not know the presence of Class 1 transactions, therefore, the notion of non-interference is supported. In each queue, transactions are scheduled in an EDF manner. Since illegal information flows are not applicable inside each security class, the EDF scheduling policy can be applied to improve the miss ratio in each class.

For concurrency control, we use two phase locking high priority (2PL-HP) [1], in which a low priority transaction is aborted upon a conflict. 2PL-HP is well studied in real-time database research and it is free of priority inversion. In our approach, upon an inter-level (i.e., between Classes 0 and 1) data conflict a Class 0 transaction always receives a higher priority. In this way, we support the notion of non-interference. Class 0 transactions can not know the presence of Class 1 transactions, since Class 0 transactions are never delayed by Class 1 transactions due to inter-level data conflicts. (We assume the delay for aborting a transaction is negligible. Hence, we assume a covert channel can not be established using the abort delay.) Note that intra-level data conflicts are resolved in favor of a transaction with the earliest deadline, since there is no security problem (in terms of mandatory access control) within one security class.

Note that STAR provides guarantees on average/transient miss ratio for both Classes 0 and 1. In real-time databases, it is essential to support consistent timing guarantees in terms of both long-run average and transient miss ratio, regardless of security classes. In this way, users can be assured of secure transaction processing with consistent timing guarantees even when the system is in the transient state. For several reasons, it is very challenging to support the specified average/transient miss ratio guarantees for both Classes 0 and 1, especially for Class 1. As the Class 0 workload increases, a multitude of Class 1 transactions can be preempted, aborted, and restarted due to possible inter-level data/resource conflicts. This is because the CPU scheduling and concurrency control are performed in favor of Class 0 to support the notion of non-interference as discussed before. Further, precise workload models and possible data/resource conflicts are usually unknown a priori in database applications. To provide MR_0 and MR_1 guarantees despite these challenges, we apply a feedback-based approach depicted in Figure 3, and described in the following subsections.



Figure 3. Miss Ratio/Utilization Controllers

3.2 Feedback Control

Feedback control is well known for its effectiveness to support a specified performance when the system model may include uncertainties [20]. The specified performance can be achieved by dynamically adapting the system behavior considering the current performance error measured in the feedback control loop. In this paper, we adapt and extend a feedback control scheduling policy for service differentiation in real-time databases [12] to provide average/transient guarantees for both MR_0 and MR_1 as follows.

3.2.1 Miss Ratio Controllers

In our approach, digital PI (proportional and integral) controllers are employed to control average/transient MR_0 and MR_1.[1] As shown in Figure 3, a miss ratio control loop $MR - LOOP_k$ belonging to Class k $(0 \leq k \leq 1)$ computes a miss ratio control signal ΔU_k based on the current performance error, $E_k = MR_s - MR_k$, i.e., the difference between the specified miss ratio and the currently measured miss ratio for Class k. At the n_{th} sampling instant, the miss

[1] A P controller alone can not eliminate a constant steady state error [20]. We also verified via simulation that P controllers can not meet *Perf-Spec*, i.e., the CPU is underutilized in our experiments. In this paper, we do not consider more complex controllers, since our PI controllers closely meet *Perf-Spec*.

ratio control signal for Class k is:

$$\Delta U_k = KP \times E_k(n) + KI \times \sum_{i=1}^{n} E_k(i) \qquad (1)$$

where $E_k(i)$ represents the miss ratio error for Class k at the i_{th} sampling instant. When overloaded, ΔU_k can become negative to request the reduction of the CPU utilization via QoS management and/or admission control. KP and KI stand for proportional and integral controller gains to be tuned to support the specified average/transient miss ratio.

3.2.2 Profiling and Controller Tuning

To support the specified average/transient miss ratio, miss ratio controllers are tuned as follows.

- $MR - LOOP_0$: To tune a miss ratio controller, the miss ratio gain, $G_{MR} = Max\{\frac{Miss\ Ratio\ Increase}{Unit\ Load\ Increase}\}$, should be derived under the worst case set-up to support a certain miss ratio guarantee [17]. To derive G_{MR}, the performance of the controlled system, i.e., a real-time database, should be profiled. Average MR_0 was measured for loads increasing from 60% to 200% by 10%. To consider the worst case, all incoming transactions are admitted, and all transactions are processed at QoS level 1. From this, we derived the MR_0 gain $G_{MR_0} = 1.295$ when the load increases from 120% to 130%. We set the sampling period to 5sec (for both miss ratio and utilization control). According to control theory, frequent sampling could improve the transient performance such as overshoot and settling time [20]. However, too frequent sampling could incur a sudden QoS degradation in our approach, especially when overloaded. For this reason, we selected the longest sampling period among several tested periods, which can support the required overshoot and settling time. (To do this, we measured the overshoot and settling time in Matlab by increasing the sampling period by 1sec starting from 1sec.) Using G_{MR_0} and the 5sec sampling period, we applied the Root Locus design method in Matlab [20] to tune KP and KI to satisfy the average/transient MR_0 specified in *Perf-Spec*. We have selected the closed loop poles at $p_0, p_1 = 0.778, 0.539$. The feedback control system is stable, since the closed loop poles are inside the unit circle. The corresponding controller gains are KP = 0.224 and KI = 0.176.
- $MR-LOOP_1$: For $MR-LOOP_1$, we also measured MR_1 for loads increasing from 60% to 200%. For MR_1, the gain G_{MR_1} = 2.288 when the load increases from 80% to 90%. It is necessary to profile MR_1 as well, since we aim to support not only the average, but also the transient miss ratio specification for Class 1. Note that G_{MR_1} is higher than G_{MR_0}, and the sharpest MR_1 increase is observed at lower loads ($80\% - 90\%$) compared to Class 0. This is mainly because the CPU scheduling and concurrency control are performed in favor of Class 0 for security reasons. To tune $MR-LOOP_1$, we applied the Root Locus method to support the average/transient miss ratio specified in *Perf-Spec*, similar to the tuning process of $MR - LOOP_0$. The closed loop poles are located inside the unit circle for the stability of $MR - LOOP_1$. The corresponding gains are KP = 0.127 and KI = 0.176.

3.2.3 Utilization Controller

To prevent a potential underutilization, one utilization control loop is employed. Note that it is necessary to use both miss ratio and utilization controllers to avoid control saturation problems. A utilization controller saturates at utilization 100%. In contrast, a miss ratio controller saturates when the system is underutilized (0 miss ratio as a result). The miss ratio (utilization) controller is activated when the system is overloaded (underutilized) to support the stability of the feedback control system by avoiding the controller saturation problems, similar to [16, 17].

At each sampling instant, a PI controller derives the utilization control signal ΔU_{util} based on the current utilization error, i.e., the difference between the target and current utilization as shown in Figure 3. The utilization control signal is derived in a PI controller, similar to Eq. 1. The utilization controller is also tuned using the Root Locus method, but we do not discuss the details due to space limitations. To further improve the CPU utilization, we also employ a utilization threshold manager as follows.

3.2.4 Utilization Threshold Manager

For many complex real-time systems, e.g., real-time databases, the schedulable utilization bound is unknown or can be very pessimistic [17]. In real-time databases, the utilization bound is hard to derive, if at all possible. This is partly because database applications usually include unpredictable aborts/restarts due to data/resource conflicts. It is a hard problem to decide a proper utilization threshold, which can avoid both the possible underutilization and excessive deadline misses due to an overly pessimistic and optimistic utilization threshold, respectively.

For this reason, we apply an online approach in which the utilization threshold (the target utilization in Figure 3 (a)) is dynamically adjusted considering the current real-time system behavior. The utilization threshold is initialized at a relatively low set point (U_{low}), e.g., 80%. If MR_0 and MR_1 are currently zero, the utilization threshold is incremented by a certain step size, e.g., 2%, unless the new utilization threshold exceeds 100%. The utilization threshold will be continuously increased as long as MR_0 and MR_1 are zero. The utilization threshold will be switched back to U_{low} when the miss ratio controller takes control. This can

be considered a somewhat conservative approach, since the utilization threshold could be decreased to the initial value upon a few deadline misses. The main objective of this back-off scheme is to prevent a potential miss ratio overshoot in real-time databases because of an overly optimistic utilization threshold. In some applications where a transient miss ratio overshoot can be considered relatively tolerable, e.g., web information systems, the utilization back-off can be performed in a stepwise manner.

Note that our approach is computationally lightweight and self-adaptive requiring no a priori knowledge about a specific workload model. Using this approach, the potentially time-varying utilization threshold can be closely approximated [12].

3.2.5 Derivation of a Single Control Signal

For the sake of consistency in control, we derive a single control signal out of two miss ratio and one utilization control signals. We first derive a single miss ratio control signal, ΔU_{MR} from ΔU_0 and ΔU_1. For this derivation, we need to consider two cases: (1) both ΔU_0 and ΔU_1 are negative at the current sampling instant, (2) only one of the two is negative or none of them is negative. In the first case, both MR_0 and MR_1 are violated. Thus, we set $\Delta U_{MR} = \sum_{k=0}^{1} \Delta U_k$ to require the enough CPU utilization reduction to avoid a significant miss ratio increase in the consecutive sampling instants. Otherwise, we set $\Delta U_{MR} = Minimum(\Delta U_0, \Delta U_1)$ to support a smooth transition from one system state to another, similar to [17]. After deriving ΔU_{MR}, we set the current control signal $\Delta U = Minimum(\Delta U_{util}, \Delta U_{MR})$ for a similar reason.

3.2.6 Integrator Antiwindup

All feedback controllers in Figure 3 are digital PI controllers. An integral controller can improve the performance of the feedback control system when used with a proportional controller. However, it is necessary to avoid for the integrator to erroneously accumulate control signals, since this can lead to a substantial overshoot later [20]. For this reason, we apply the integrator antiwindup technique [20] as follows.

- **Case 1** ($\Delta U_{MR} > \Delta U_{util}$): Turn on the integrator for the utilization controller, but turn off all integrators of $MR - LOOP_k$ $(0 \leq k \leq 1)$, since the current $\Delta U = \Delta U_{util}$. This prevents an erroneous accumulation of miss ratio control signals.
- **Case 2** ($\Delta U_{MR} \leq \Delta U_{util}$): In this case, turn off the integrator for the utilization controller, since the current $\Delta U = \Delta U_{MR}$. This prevents an erroneous accumulation of the utilization control signal. For miss ratio controllers, if $\Delta U_0 < 0$ and $\Delta U_1 < 0$, turn on the integrators for both $MR - LOOP_0$ and $MR - LOOP_1$. This is because the current $\Delta U = \sum_{k=0}^{1} \Delta U_k$. Otherwise, only turn on the integrator of $MR - LOOP_k$ whose miss ratio control signal is smaller than the other. This prevents an erroneous accumulation of the miss ratio control signal by one of the two miss ratio controllers whose signal is greater than the other.

3.3 QoS Manager and Admission Controller

When the system is overloaded, i.e., $\Delta U < 0$, the CPU utilization can be reduced by degrading the QoS level from 1 to 0 for some transactions in the system. More specifically, QoS degradations are performed by applying an imprecise computation technique, called milestone approach [15].

The admission controller is another system component that can enforce the control signal together with the QoS Manager, if necessary. As shown in Figure 2, the QoS Manager informs the admission controller of the new control signal, called ΔU_{new}, adjusted after possible QoS degradations. Admission control is necessary, since under severely overloaded conditions the QoS Manager itself might not be able to enforce the current ΔU entirely. In contrast, more transactions should be admitted when underutilized. (We assume that all incoming transactions are already authenticated, therefore, our admission controller only considers workload adjustments instead of dealing with security problems such as denial of service attacks.)

In our approach, a newly incoming transaction can be admitted, if its estimated CPU utilization requirement is currently available. The current utilization is examined by aggregating the utilization estimates of the previously admitted transactions.

4 Performance Evaluation

In this section, we analyze the performance of our approach. The main objective of the performance evaluation is to observe whether or not STAR can support *Perf-Spec*, while supporting the Bell-LaPadula access restrictions and notion of non-interference. We have developed a real-time database simulator, which simulates the real-time database architecture depicted in Figure 3. In our simulator, each component in Figure 3 can be selectively turned on/off for performance evaluation purposes. Baseline approaches are introduced for performance comparisons. We describe workload variables and performed sets of experiments, and present the performance evaluation results.

4.1 Simulation Model

Our simulation model is described as follows.

- **Execution Time and Deadline**: A source, $Source_i$, generates a group of real-time transactions whose inter-

arrival time is exponentially distributed. $Source_i$ is associated with an estimated execution time (EET_i) and an average execution time (AET_i). We set $EET_i = Uniform(5ms, 20ms)$. By generating multiple sources, we can derive transaction groups with different average execution time and average number of data accesses in a statistical manner. We can also increase the workload applied to the simulated real-time database by increasing the number of sources, since more transactions will be generated in a certain time interval. We set $AET_i = (1 + EstErr) \times EET_i$, in which $EstErr$ is used to introduce the execution time estimation errors. Note that STAR and all baseline approaches (discussed in Section 4.2) are only aware of the estimated execution time. Upon the generation of a transaction, $Source_i$ generates an actual execution time by applying the normal distribution $Normal(AET_i, \sqrt{AET_i})$ to introduce the execution time variance in the corresponding transaction group. We set *deadline = arrival time + average execution time* $\times$ *slack factor*. A slack factor is uniformly distributed in a range (10, 20).

• **QoS**: Transactions at QoS level 0 are assumed to require a half of the original execution time, i.e., *actual execution* $time_0$ = 0.5 $\times$ *actual execution* $time_1$. In our performance evaluation, we directly relate QoS level 0 and 1 to numeric value 0 and 1, respectively. By taking the average of QoS levels for all processed transactions, we can observe the fraction of transactions serviced at their full QoS levels. For example, when the measured average QoS = 0.6, 60% of the transactions are processed at QoS level 1 (and 40% of transactions are processed at QoS level 0).

• **Number of Data Accesses**: The number of data accesses for $Source_i$ is derived in proportion to the length of EET_i, i.e., N_{DATA_i} = *data access factor* $\times$ EET_i = $(5, 20)$. Therefore, longer transactions access more data in general. Upon the generation of a transaction, $Source_i$ associates the actual number of data accesses with the transaction by applying $Normal(N_{DATA_i}, \sqrt{N_{DATA_i}})$ to introduce the variance in the transaction group.

• **Security and Data**: Each source is associated with a security class, i.e., Class 0 or 1, and transactions generated from a source are accordingly scheduled in Q_0 or Q_1 as shown in Figure 2. All data items in the database are also classified into Classes 0 and 1. When accessing data, each transaction follows the access restrictions imposed by the Bell-LaPadula model, i.e., read-below and write-above.

4.2 Baselines

We have developed three baseline approaches to compare with STAR:

• **Open**: In this approach, all incoming transactions are admitted and serviced with the full QoS regardless of the current miss ratio. The closed-loop scheduling is not employed. Hence, all the shaded components in Figure 2 are turned off. Note that most database systems take this open-loop and non-adaptive approach.

• **Open-AC**: This is similar to *Open* except that admission control is applied in this approach. Hence, potential overloads can be partially managed by admission control.

• **Covert-AC**: This approach is similar to *Open-AC*, however, the notion of non-interference is not supported for performance reasons. This approach only considers transaction deadlines to resolve both intra- and inter-level data/resource conflicts. A mandatory access control mechanism based on Bell-LaPadula model is applied to prevent illegal *direct* information transfer between Classes 0 and 1. However, the indirect information transfer using covert channels are not prevented at all. By considering this baseline approach, we can measure the performance penalty, if any, required to fully support the notion of non-interference in our approach. Note that *Covert-AC* could show a better performance, especially in terms of MR_1, compared to existing approaches such as [3, 21], in which inter-level data/resource conflicts are temporarily resolved in terms of deadlines instead of security levels, to trade off security to improve the miss ratio, if necessary.

4.3 Workload Variables

In this section, we describe the workload variables used in our performance evaluation.

Table 1. Load Relieved by QoS degradation

Avg. QoS	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1
Rel. Load	37.5%	30%	22.5%	15%	7.5%	0%
Rel. Load	50%	40%	30%	20%	10%	0%

• **AppLoad** (Applied Load): In general, computational systems may show different, possibly worse, performance for increasing loads, especially when overloaded. We use a variable, called $AppLoad$, to apply different workloads in the simulation. Note that this variable indicates the load assuming that all incoming transactions are admitted and all transactions are serviced at their full QoS levels. The actual load can be reduced in a tested approach by applying admission control and degrading the QoS, if necessary. The workload relieved from QoS degradation (Rel. Load) = $0.5 \times (1 - Average\ QoS) \times AppLoad$, since the transaction execution time at QoS level 0 is a half of that at level 1 as discussed before. Table 1 presents the loads relieved from QoS degradation when $AppLoad = 150\%$ and 200%, respectively. The remaining potential overload, if any, should be managed by admission control to prevent a miss ratio overshoot.

• **EstErr** (Execution Time Estimation Error): In our experiments, $EstErr$ is used to introduce errors in execution time estimates as described in Section 4.1. A high execution time estimation error could generally induce a difficulty in real-time scheduling.

• **HCR** (High Priority Class Ratio): As the Class 0 workload increases, it could be more challenging to support the specified average/transient miss ratio, especially for MR_1. This is because Class 0 transactions receive a higher priority in the CPU scheduling and concurrency control to prevent covert channels in all tested approaches except *Covert-AC*. To adjust the Class 0 workload, we define a workload variable:

$$HCR = 100 \times \frac{\#Class\ 0\ Transactions}{\sum_{i=0}^{1} \#Class\ i\ Transactions}(\%).$$

In this paper, we only present the performance results when $HCR = 20\%$ due to space limitations. We verified that our approach can also support *Perf-Spec* for higher HCR values. Refer to [13] for more details.

• **DB_SIZE** (Database Size): Database performance can vary as the degree of the data contention changes [1, 10]. To model this, we applied our approach for different DB_SIZE (database sizes), i.e., 1,000, 10,000 and 100,000 data items. In general, a small database size may incur a higher degree of data contention for given a set of transactions [1]. Due to space limitations, in this paper we only present the case of 1,000 data items, which may have the highest degree of data contention due to the smallest database size among the tested ones. We verified that our approach can also support *Perf-Spec* for different database sizes. For more details, refer to [13].

4.4 Experiments

In this paper, we present two sets of experiments described as follows.

• **Experiment Set 1**: For performance evaluation, we applied $AppLoad = 70\%, 100\%, 150\%$, and 200% and we set $HCR = 20\%$. We set $EstErr = 0$ in this set of experiments. This is the best case set-up in our experiments.

• **Experiment Set 2**: To show the applicability of our approach against inaccurate execution time estimates, we have evaluated the performance for $EstErr$ = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 1. We set $AppLoad = 200\%$ and $HCR = 20\%$.

In our experiments, one simulation run lasts for 10 minutes of simulated time. For all performance data, we have taken the average of 10 simulation runs and derived the 90% confidence intervals. Confidence intervals are plotted as vertical bars in the graphs showing the performance evaluation results. (For some performance data, the vertical bars may not be noticeable due to the small confidence intervals.)

4.5 Experiment Set 1: Effects of Increasing Loads



Figure 4. Average Miss Ratio for Open



Figure 5. Average Miss Ratio for Open-AC



Figure 6. Average Miss Ratio for Covert-AC

In this section, we compare the performance of *Open, Open-AC, Covert-AC,* and STAR for increasing $AppLoad$. We compare the average performance of all tested approaches and present the transient miss ratio of STAR.

4.5.1 Average Performance

As shown in Figures 4 – 7, all tested approaches (i.e., all baseline approaches and STAR) show near zero MR_0 (miss



Figure 7. Average Miss Ratio for STAR



Figure 8. Average Utilization

ratio for Class 0) for increasing $AppLoad$. However, tested approaches showed different MR_1 as follows.

As shown in Figure 4, for $Open$ MR_1 is approximately 80% when $AppLoad = 200\%$. As shown in Figure 5, by applying admission control *Open-AC* significantly improved MR_1 compared to $Open$: MR_1 is $8.59 \pm 1.79\%$ when $AppLoad = 200\%$. However, this exceeds the average miss ratio 5% required in *Perf-Spec*. As shown in Figure 6, *Cover-AC* shows near zero MR_0 and MR_1 by allowing potential covert channels. As shown in Figure 7, STAR shows MR_1 of $2.21 \pm 0.59\%$ when $AppLoad = 200\%$, which meets *Perf-Spec* but this is slightly worse than



Figure 9. Average Throughput



Figure 10. Transient MR_0 and MR_1 for STAR

Covert-AC. This is because *Covert-AC* only considers transaction deadlines for scheduling and concurrency control. As a result, sensitive information in real-time databases may not be protected. Also, in this set of experiments we set $EstErr = 0$. However, precise execution time estimates are generally not available. In fact, *Covert-AC* showed a relatively poor performance when only approximate execution time estimates are available. It did not satisfy even the average miss ratio requirement, which can be considered relatively easy to meet than the specified transient miss ratio. (A detailed discussion is given in Section 4.6.)

As shown in Figure 8, for *Open, Open-AC*, and *Covert-AC* the utilization quickly reaches 100% as $AppLoad$ increases leading to potential overloads and the resulting miss ratio increase. In comparison, for STAR the utilization ranges between $70\% - 90\%$ for increasing $AppLoad$ as shown in Figure 8. This is because in our approach the CPU utilization is controlled in the feedback control loops to avoid both overload and underutilization. Under overload, the CPU utilization is reduced by admission control and QoS degradation, if necessary.

One may argue that STAR can provide a good miss ratio, since admission control drops many transactions. However, we show that admission control can actually improve the *real-time database throughput* $= \frac{\#\texttt{Timely}}{\#\texttt{Submitted}}$ where $\#\texttt{Timely}$ and $\#\texttt{Submitted}$ represent the number of transactions which commit within their deadlines and that submitted to system (before admission control).

As shown in Figure 9, $Open$ shows the lowest throughput among the tested approaches as $AppLoad$ increases. Since $Open$ simply admits all incoming transactions, the simulated real-time database is overloaded incurring many deadline misses. As a result, the throughput of $Open$ is below 40% when $AppLoad = 200\%$. By applying admission control (and allowing potential covert channels in *Covert-AC*), *Open-AC* and *Covert-AC* improve the throughput by approximately 10% compared to $Open$ when $AppLoad = 200\%$. From these results, observe that admission control is a sensible approach to prevent overload (and improve the

throughput) in real-time databases.

Compared to *Open*, *Open-AC*, and *Covert-AC*, STAR shows a relatively high throughput especially given a high $AppLoad$ as shown in Figure 9. When $AppLoad = 200\%$, the throughput of STAR is $66.67 \pm 3.67\%$ achieving more than 25% throughput improvement compared to $Open$ at the expense of the degraded QoS. For STAR, the average QoS decreases from 100% (when $AppLoad = 70\%$) down to $63.17 \pm 7.03\%$ when $AppLoad = 200\%$, i.e., approximately 55% of transactions are processed at QoS level 1. (In other sets of experiments, STAR showed the average QoS between $50\% - 60\%$, while achieving the throughput between $60\% - 70\%$, similar to the results presented in this section. We do not include the results due to space limitations.)

In all baseline approaches, the average QoS is 100%, since they do not degrade the QoS regardless of the current system status such as miss ratio. In real-time systems, QoS degradation using some techniques such as the milestone approach [15] is generally considered more tolerable than deadline misses. For example, it might be better to degrade the resolution of radar images rather than having lots of deadline misses in target tracking. Also, it was empirically observed that a significant fraction of potential clients in web-based e-commerce systems leave the corresponding web sites, if responses for queries take longer than a certain time, e.g., 5sec [7]. In this case, the QoS of the web page can be degraded by only returning the textual information to improve the response time. Large objects such as images can be transmitted later when the network and server loads are low.

4.5.2 Transient Miss Ratio of STAR

In this section, we present the transient miss ratio observed for our approach. In this paper, we do not present the transient miss ratio for baseline approaches, since they can not support the security property and/or specified average miss ratio under many simulation settings as discussed before. In Figure 10, transient MR_0 and MR_1 are presented for our approach when $AppLoad = 200\%$, i.e., the highest load tested. A dotted horizontal line in the figure represents the specified miss ratio threshold, i.e., 5%. MR_0 is near zero through the experiment. The MR_1 overshoot of 7.43% is observed at 395sec slightly exceeding the specified overshoot $M_p = 6\%$. Since the feedback control system is *reactive* to the performance error, some overshoot might be inevitable [20]. Especially, it is hard to meet the transient MR_1 specification in our approach due to the scheduling and concurrency control favoring Class 0 to support the notion of non-interference. For this set of experiments, the degree of data conflicts can also be very high due to the smallest database size among the tested ones. The transient miss ratio is improved for larger database sizes [13]. A further investigation to reduce the MR_1 overshoot is reserved for future work.

In terms of settling time, the specified settling time of 80sec is satisfied; a few miss ratio overshoots exceeding $M_p(= 6\%)$ first observed at 360sec decays until 400sec. Therefore, we may consider that our approach has closely satisfied the transient miss ratio specification.

4.6 Experiment Set 2: Effects of Increasing Execution Time Estimation Error

In this section, we compare the performance of *Open-AC, Covert-AC*, and STAR for increasing $EstErr$. $Open$ is dropped due to its poor performance as discussed in Section 4.5.



Figure 11. Average MR_0



Figure 12. Average MR_1

4.6.1 Average Performance

Covert-AC, which showed the best performance in $Experiment\ Set\ 1$, shows over 30% of MR_0 and MR_1 as shown in Figures 11 and 12. This is mainly because there could be large errors in admission control as $EstErr$ increases. As a result, too many transactions could be admitted to the system and eventually miss their deadlines. As shown in Figures 11 and 12, for *Covert-AC* deadline misses



Figure 13. Average Utilization



Figure 14. Transient Miss Ratio for STAR

are equally divided into Classes 0 and 1 in an approximate sense. This is because *Covert-AC* only considers transaction deadlines for scheduling and concurrency control. For *Open-AC* and STAR, MR_1 is relatively high compared to MR_0, since they support the notion of non-interference via the CPU scheduling and concurrency control in favor of Class 0 as discussed before.

In Figure 11, *Open-AC* shows near zero MR_0. However, MR_1 exceeds 60% when $EstErr = 1$ as shown in Figure 12. Even though *Open-AC* might be considered secure in terms of database access control, such a high miss ratio is not acceptable for real-time database applications. In contrast, STAR shows near zero MR_0, and MR_1 is only $1.72\% \pm 0.49\%$ when $EstErr = 1$ as shown in Figures 11 and 12. This is because in our approach the system performance, in terms of miss ratio and utilization, is periodically monitored, and admission control and QoS degradation are applied, if necessary to support *Perf-Spec*. For STAR, the average QoS ranged between $50\% - 60\%$ for this set of experiments.

As shown in Figure 13, for *Open-AC* and *Covert-AC* the CPU is saturated leading to significant violations of the specified miss ratio. STAR managed the utilization around 90% without violating the specified miss ratio.

4.6.2 Transient Miss Ratio of STAR

In Figure 14, we present transient MR_0 and MR_1 observed for STAR when $EstErr = 1$, i.e., the highest $EstErr$ tested. Similar to Figure 10, MR_0 is near zero through the experiment. The highest MR_1 is 5.6% at 160sec and it decays in 10sec (two sampling periods). Therefore, the overshoot and settling time specified in *Perf-Spec* are satisfied. One can observe that MR_1 overshoot is slightly lower than that presented in Figure 10. This is mainly due to the relatively low QoS observed in this set of experiments (approximately 50% when $EstErr = 1$) compared to that measured in $Experiment\ Set\ 1$ (approximately 63% when $AppLoad = 200\%$). In this set of experiments, the feedback controller becomes more reactive for increasing $EstErr$ requiring a relatively large CPU utilization reduction under overload.

5 Related Work

Recently, transaction processing in (non-real-time) multi-level secure databases has been actively studied [4, 11]. As a result, some commercial products such as Trusted Oracle [18] and Sybase Secure SQL Server [22] can partially prevent covert channels. However, secure transaction processing in real-time databases, which are needed in security-critical environments, has attracted relatively little research efforts despite its importance.

Several research work such as [3, 21] considered the security of real-time database a performance criterion, which can be traded off under overloaded conditions. In their approaches, illegal direct information flows (between different security levels) are prevented by applying the Bell-LaPadula access restrictions. However, they did not completely prevent the illegal information transfer using covert channels. Instead, they assumed that a temporary trade-off of security is acceptable to improve the deadline miss ratio. However, these approaches can face a significant problem by allowing a security hole; sensitive information can be illegally disclosed to transactions without appropriate levels of security clearance.

In [8], George et al. addressed this problem by preventing the illegal information transfer, both direct and indirect ones. In their approach, the Bell-LaPadula access restrictions and notion of non-interference are always enforced regardless of the current deadline miss ratio. They presented a novel concurrency control policy called dual approach. Among different security levels, data conflicts are resolved in favor of lower security level transactions to support the notion of non-interference. Within each security level, data conflicts are resolved in favor of transaction deadlines to improve the miss ratio, since there is no possibility of an illegal inter-level information flow.

Our approach is similar to [8] in the sense that we do not allow illegal intra- and inter-level information flows. However, unlike their approach we provide guarantees on average/transient miss ratio. By preventing covert channels, we exceed the US military's security standards defined in the *Orange Book* [19]. In that specification, covert channels of bandwidth of less than one bit per second, which could be hard to measure, are typically considered acceptable. Furthermore, we provide guarantees on average/transient miss ratio considering timing constraints prevalent in real-time database applications. To our best knowledge, no previous work has considered providing miss ratio guarantees while preventing the illegal direct/indirect inter-level information transfer in real-time databases.

6 Conclusions and Future Work

In this paper, we presented a novel real-time database architecture for secure transaction processing with certain miss ratio guarantees. Considering the importance of security and transaction timeliness in many real-time database applications, e.g., e-commerce, online stock trading, agile manufacturing, and military operations, the contribution of our work could be significant. Our contribution might increase as the demand for secure real-time transaction processing increases. In a simulation study, we showed that our approach can significantly improve the miss ratio compared to several baselines, while supporting the mandatory access control mechanism based on Bell-LaPadula model and the notion of non-interference to prevent the illegal direct/indirect information transfer between different security classes. According to the performance evaluation results, our approach was able to support the specified average/transient miss ratio. In contrast, the baseline approaches failed to support the specified miss ratio. In the future, we are interested in supporting multiple security levels and considering other security models, which are more flexible than the multilevel security model.

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